Paper 5 of 5
Bundle IQ Research Series · 2026
Demand Aggregation and SME Buying Power
Evidence from UK Buying Pools Pools and the Case for Collective Procurement
By Bundle IQ Research
·Founder & CEO, Bundle IQ Limited
·Procurement & Supply Chain Transformation Consultant
·Published April 2026
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Abstract
This paper examines demand aggregation as a mechanism for extending enterprise-level buying power to SMEs, drawing on evidence from Bundle IQ's Buying Pools pools and the academic literature on purchasing consortia. We document the structure and performance of 10 active pools across seven spend categories, with combined membership of 289 businesses and £8.2 million in annual spend under management. We find pool-based savings of 12–28% versus individual SME procurement. We examine the institutional design features that distinguish Bundle IQ's pool model from traditional buying consortia — specifically the preservation of individual supplier relationships and elimination of joint liability — and their implications for SME participation rates.
1. Background: Purchasing Consortia and SME Access
Demand aggregation — coordinating purchasing requirements across independent organisations to achieve volume pricing not available to individual buyers — has a substantial academic literature and long history of practice. Public sector consortia (Crown Commercial Service), professional association purchasing groups, and co-operative arrangements have consistently demonstrated that aggregated demand produces materially better pricing than equivalent fragmented demand.
Despite this evidence, SME participation in formal consortia has historically been limited. Schotanus and Telgen (2007) identify the primary barriers as: administrative burden, legal complexity, specification incompatibility, and perceived loss of supplier relationships. Bundle IQ's Buying Pools model was designed to address each barrier specifically.
"Volume discounts have always existed. The question was never whether aggregation works. The question was why SMEs couldn't access it. The answer was institutional friction, not market structure."
2. Bundle IQ Pool Structure and Design
2.1 Three distinguishing design principles
- No joint liability — each member contracts individually with the winning supplier at the pool rate. Benefits without liability for other members' contracts.
- No minimum commitment — members join, benefit from pool pricing when it goes to market, and exit at any time without penalty.
- Specification flexibility — requirements are defined at category level, allowing members with slightly different needs to participate while retaining individual specification optionality.
2.2 Current pool portfolio (Q1 2026)
£8.2M
Combined annual spend
91%
Pool-to-contract conversion rate
- IT Support (SME): 23 members · £1.2M · Active
- Energy (Q3 2026 cohort): 41 members · £2.1M · Going to market Q2 2026
- Business Insurance: 18 members · £0.8M · Active
- Facilities Management (London): 29 members · £1.4M · Active
- Cybersecurity: 34 members · £0.9M · Active
- HR Software & Payroll: 16 members · £0.4M · Forming
- Logistics & Couriers: 52 members · £0.8M · Active
- Telecoms: 38 members · £0.4M · Active
- Legal Services: 11 members · £0.5M · Active
- Print & Signage: 27 members · £0.2M · Active
3. Evidence on Pool Savings
3.1 Completed pool events (six of ten)
- IT Support (first event): 24% saving. 23 members. All contracted.
- Energy (2025 cohort): 32% saving. 38 members. 34 contracted.
- Business Insurance: 18% saving. 15 members. 12 contracted.
- Facilities Management: 21% saving. 24 members. 21 contracted.
- Logistics & Couriers: 19% saving. 47 members. 44 contracted.
- Telecoms: 15% saving. 31 members. 28 contracted.
The 91% conversion rate from pool participation to contract award is significantly above the 68–74% reported in the academic literature for traditional buying consortia (Essig, 2000). The higher rate likely reflects the elimination of joint liability and simplified contracting, which remove the principal reasons for participating but declining to contract.
3.2 The network effect
Pools with more than 30 members achieve average savings 6–8 percentage points higher than pools with fewer than 15 members, holding category constant. Larger pools produce better outcomes, creating a natural incentive for continued recruitment to active pools.
4. Participation Patterns
4.1 Why businesses join
Survey of 68 pool members (Q4 2025): financial saving (94%), time saving in procurement process (71%), access to pre-vetted suppliers (58%), benchmark intelligence (47%).
4.2 Barriers to participation
Survey of 45 non-participating registered users: specification incompatibility (26%), timing mismatch between pool market event and individual renewal (38%), inertia (36%). The implication: timing alignment between pool events and contract renewal cycles is a material determinant of participation rates.
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications
Pool-based savings of 12–28% versus individual SME rates, with a 91% conversion rate from participation to contract award, provide strong empirical support for demand aggregation as a mechanism for extending enterprise-level procurement outcomes to SMEs.
The Procurement Act 2023 creates new requirements for public sector bodies to support SME access to government contracting. Demand aggregation on the supply side — helping SMEs to buy collectively as well as sell more effectively — represents a complementary measure not currently addressed in policy. Bundle IQ will continue to publish pool performance data quarterly as the programme scales.
References
Schotanus, F. & Telgen, J. (2007). Developing a Typology of Organisational Forms of Cooperative Purchasing. JPSM, 13(1), 53–68.
Essig, M. (2000). Purchasing Consortia as Symbiotic Relationships. EJPSM, 6(1), 13–22.
Crown Commercial Service (2025). SME Action Plan and Procurement Act 2023 Implementation Report.
Bundle IQ (2026). Buying Pools Pool Performance Data, 2025–2026 (proprietary).
BEIS (2024). Small Business Survey 2023: Finance and Procurement Practices.
Citation: Bundle IQ Research (2026). Demand Aggregation and SME Buying Power.
Bundle IQ Research Series, Paper 5. Bundle IQ Limited. Available at: bundleiq.co.uk
Published under Creative Commons Attribution licence (CC BY 4.0).
Free to cite, share, and adapt with attribution.
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